A "Shaftesburyian" Project

My research moves between abstract questions about the role of emotions in moral epistemology and concrete questions about specific emotions and corresponding virtues. My plan is to bring these two strands of my work together in a book, tentatively titled Real Sentimentalism. This book will defend a comprehensive moral epistemology, one which combines sentimentalism about moral knowledge with realism about the nature of moral properties.

Much of the inspiration for taking this approach is from the work of Anthony Ashley Cooper (1671-1713), or as he is more commonly known, the Third Earl of Shaftesbury. While Shaftesbury is sometimes interpreted as holding a precarious blend of a rationalist moral metaphysics and a sentimentalist moral epistemology, I contend that his approach is more plausible than meets the eye, and stands poised to solve many theoretical difficulties.

General Affect and Moral Epistemology

"Taking the Perceptual Analogy Seriously." in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19.4 (2016): 897-915. [Draft]/[Final Version]

*Winner of the 2017 Routledge, Taylor & Francis Prize awarded by the APA to the two best papers published by limited-term faculty in 2016.

"Intellect versus Affect: Finding Leverage in an Old Debate." in Philosophical Studies 174.9 (2017): 2251-2276. [Draft]/[Final Version]

"On the Epistemological Significance of Value Perception.” in Evaluative Perception: Aesthetic, Ethical, and Normative, eds. Anna Bergqvist and Robert Cowan (Oxford University Press, 2018). [Draft]/[Final Version]   

Review of Emotional Insight: The Epistemic Role of Emotional Experience by Michael Brady. Ethics 125.2 (2015). [Draft]/[Final Version]

Review of Ethical Sentimentalism: New Perspectives. Eds. Remy Debes and Karsten R. Stueber. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. [Final Version]

Concrete Affect  and Ethics

"Finding Hope." Forthcoming in Canadian Journal of Philosophy. [Draft]

"Desiring Under the Proper Guise." with Mark Schroeder. Forthcoming in Oxford Studies in Metaethics. [Draft]

"A Perceptual Theory of Hope." with Katie Stockdale. in Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy (2018). [Final Version]

"Hope." Forthcoming in International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Ed. Hugh LaFollette. Wiley-Blackwell.

"Hope, Enthusiasm, and Excitement." with Hunter Threadgill and Philip Gable. Commissioned for the Routledge Handbook of Emotion Theory, ed. Andrea Scarantino. [Awaiting final review]

For Popular Audiences & Students

"Hope." with Katie Stockdale. in 1000-Word Philosophy: An Introductory Anthology [Final Version]                        

Work Under Review 

*Please contact me for drafts of this work.

Paper on dreams (Revise and Resubmit)

Paper on the cognitive base of emotions (with Hichem Naar) 

Paper on hope and virtue

Paper defending perceptualism about emotions from the Attitudinalist Challenge

Paper on hope and belief (draft available upon request)

In Preparation

Real Sentimentalism (book manuscript)

"Sentimental Perceptualism and the Armchair: A Sketch of a Comprehensive Epistemology of Value" (draft available upon request)

*A previous version of this manuscript has been cited by other scholars under the title, "Armchair Moral Knowledge and the Perceptual Analogy."

"On the Prospects for a Secular Virtue of Hope" 

"Desire and the Guise of Reasons"

"Moral Perception and Disagreement"

"Rational Perception and Rational Emotion"