General Affect and Moral Epistemology
"Taking the Perceptual Analogy Seriously." in Ethical Theory and Moral Practice 19.4 (2016): 897-915. [Draft]
*Winner of the 2017 Routledge, Taylor & Francis Prize awarded by the APA to the two best papers published by limited-term faculty in 2016.
"Intellect versus Affect: Finding Leverage in an Old Debate." in Philosophical Studies 174.9 (2017): 2251-2276. [Draft]
"On the Epistemological Significance of Value Perception." Forthcoming in Evaluative Perception: Aesthetic, Ethical, and Normative, eds. Anna Bergqvist and Robert Cowan (Oxford University Press). [Draft]
Review of Emotional Insight: The Epistemic Role of Emotional Experience by Michael Brady. Ethics 125.2 (2015). [Draft]
Review of Ethical Sentimentalism: New Perspectives. Eds. Remy Debes and Karsten R. Stueber. Notre Dame Philosophical Reviews. [Final Version]
Concrete Affect and Ethics
"Finding Hope." Forthcoming in Canadian Journal of Philosophy. [Draft]
"Desiring Under the Proper Guise." with Mark Schroeder. Forthcoming in Oxford Studies in Metaethics. [Draft]
"A Perceptual Theory of Hope." with Katie Stockdale. in Ergo, an Open Access Journal of Philosophy (2018). [Final Version]
"Hope, Enthusiasm, and Excitement." with Hunter Threadgill and Philip Gable. Commissioned for the Routledge Handbook of Emotion Theory, ed. Andrea Scarantino.
"Hope." Commissioned for the International Encyclopedia of Ethics. Ed. Hugh LaFollette. Wiley-Blackwell.
Work Under Review / In Preparation
"Sentimental Perceptualism and the Armchair: A Sketch of a Comprehensive Epistemology of Value" (under review) (Draft available upon request)
*A previous version of this manuscript has been cited by other scholars under the title, "Armchair Moral Knowledge and the Perceptual Analogy."